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1 Introduction 
Thomas HDCobbes famously argued that life
without the state is ‘nasty, brutish and short’
(Hobbes 1939 [1651]). And when the
government of Zaire finally collapsed in the face
of the 1996 revolutionary invasion from Rwanda,
Burundi and Uganda, the consequences for the
peoples of eastern Congo were all of these
disasters and more. But if the national state
collapsed for a time, what happened to local
governance? What role did its institutions play in
coping with human insecurity? How, in turn,
were they affected by it? And what has been their
part in rebuilding governance? State
reconstruction usually is approached from the
top-down, with a focus on core central
government functions; in this article I look at it
from the bottom-up.2
Local governance is defined by Anwar and Sana
Shah (2007) as the formulation and execution of
collective action at the local level. Thus, it
encompasses direct and indirect roles of formal
institutions of local government and governmental
hierarchies as well as the roles of informal norms,
networks, community organisations and
neighbourhood associations in pursuing collective
action by defining the framework for citizen–
citizen and citizen–state interactions, collective
decision-making and delivery of public services.
Understandably, institutions work better in
situations of peace, when they result from a long
evolution of delineated administrative entities.
Institutions of local governance find anchorage
in identifiable spaces. But what happens to local
institutions and governance when they face
situations of war, conflict and delocalisation?
Some communities in South Kivu Province have
experienced periods of recurrent wars and
unending violence for more than 15 years. Did
this fate help consolidate local traditional
institutions by relying on them in order to find
ways of living without the state or supplementing
its inabilities in sustaining peace, stability and
development? It is interesting to explore the way
local systems of governance and networking in
South Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) have been affected by the
civil war, how their changes have affected the
recreation of human security in that province,
and what governance structures and networks
the various communities created or used to try
and provide for their human security (broadly
understood as physical security, shelter, health,
food and education). 
What aspects of their social structures did they
mobilise and which ones broke down? What new
structures were created? What kind of networks
of relationships with external actors did they
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develop as part of their coping strategy? The
particular situation of South Kivu, during the
revolutionary war of 1996, the rebellion of 1998,
the regime of the late President Laurent Kabila
and the current one of Joseph Kabila, proves that
life in South Kivu has been indeed uncertain and
challenging. However, a combination of internal
and international actors, each serving its own
interests has contained the deterioration of the
social fabric to a certain degree and maintained
the existence of a greater community.
Since 2003, sustained efforts have been made to
reunify the country. Presidential and
parliamentarian elections were held in 2006 and
in November 2011. How did governance and
network structures and their changes affect the
recreation of human security in South Kivu once
the major combatants at the national level had
negotiated a peace? As the violent conflict
subsided, how were the various communities
reincorporated into the larger political order and
how did they re-establish the various dimensions
of their human security? What social structures
were central to the reincorporation and/or
improvements in security? What networks were
employed?
These questions matter for many reasons.
Democracy and lasting peace in the DRC depend
on how local communities are reintegrated in the
larger Congolese nation and how they work
together and share the future despite their
differences and early antagonisms. As has
occurred before, a threat to the security of a
particular group because of its exclusion might
also have negative backlash on the security of
other communities.
Policies dealing with early recovery and fragile
states often consider that the stabilisation of
post-conflict countries should initiate combined
actions aiming at humanitarian relief and at
strengthening the authority of the state.
Although the institutional building of local
communities is also listed on the agenda, this
process is sometimes little emphasised. The
policy ends up ignoring structures of local
governance, initiated by local communities
during the period when the state was away. Yet,
during the absence of the state, local
communities engineer ways to survive, using
some old pre-existing institutions, creating new
ones and drawing on international resources.
South Kivu is also interesting because of the
involvement of Rwanda and Burundi, to different
degrees, in the games local actors and
communities play to foster their interests. When
communities can draw on external resources or
backing, the extension of such networks might
establish another dimension or axis for
maintaining fear and distrust among groups and
limit their ability to cooperate in finding
appropriate and uncontested solutions for their
common future. The interests of communities, or
of some factions within them, and the interests
of states might differ at some point and maintain
simmering conflict and tension which, on
occasion, may trigger again open confrontation.
2 Methods 
This article, based on the original report (Mushi
2011), is based on unstructured interviews with
traditional authorities, territorial
administrators, church representatives,
journalists, medics, elected representatives and
former members of Maï Maï rebel groups
throughout all of South Kivu Province (save for
the Shabunda Territory3 and the island of Idjwi)
during October and November4 2010. 
Interviews also extended to influential civil
society members at the provincial level, and staff
of local and international non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). 
The report further draws on documentary
evidence, including the regular reports of the
various territorial administrators. Also consulted
were various reports and articles written on the
region and previous research studies. 
This article is structured as follows: it starts with
the administrative configuration of South Kivu
in order to provide an understanding of its local
structures of governance. It next discusses the
background to the war and its causes. Then the
article describes major findings on governance,
security at large, and on networking, before
drawing conclusions.
3 The administrative and institutional
configuration of South Kivu
The DRC has been dominated for many decades
by mismanagement, poor governance, recurrent
insecurity, war,5 and institutional instability. The
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east of South (Sud) Kivu Province has experienced
major insecurity over the last 15 years. South Kivu
shares its borders with the provinces of North
Kivu, Maniema and Katanga, and three countries:
Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. It covers a surface
area of 64,719 square kilometres (Ministère du
Plan 2005) and its current population was
estimated at 4,687,744 inhabitants in 2009 (ibid.
2009). Its industrial base is weak. The province is
composed of the territories of Kabare, Walungu,
Kalehe, Shabunda, Mwenga, Uvira, Fizi and the
island of Idjwi in Lake Kivu. 
The administrative architecture is composed of
three layers: the provincial layer, the
intermediary layer and the community layer.6
According to the recent constitution the
provincial administration is a decentralised
entity which shares some powers with the
national government and yet possesses some
domains of regulation in which the province is
self-determined.7 The main political arena is the
provincial assembly to which deputies are elected
during local elections.8 The governor and the vice
governor are elected by the provincial assembly,
which also possesses powers to approve their
programmes and/or to dismiss them. 
The governor assumes political leadership over
the whole province. From 1996–2006 the
governor was designated as the President’s
representative in the province. He led all
provincial services and supervised public offices
and services that hierarchically derived from the
central power, such as the intelligence services,
the police and the army. Yet since independence
this position has mostly been volatile. According
to Mwami Auguste Mopipi Mukulumanya, from
1966–2010, the province had 15 governors.
Since the 2006 elections, South Kivu has been
governed by four successive provincial
governments. The provincial political arena has
been dominated by instability and the inability of
the provincial government to build an
autonomous local coalition capable of seriously
tackling insecurity and development problems.9
The capital city of the province, Bukavu, also
constitutes a decentralised entity managed by
the mayor and his assistants. Since elections
have not yet been organised at this level, the
occupation of this position depends on patrons
and good favour within the hierarchical levels of
the governate of the province, the Minister of the
Interior and the President. 
Territories are extended branches of state
administration, representing the central
government. Their officials are designated by the
central Ministry of the Interior, and included in
the budgetary provisions of the state.10 Territorial
administrators depend directly on the Ministry
of the Interior, although they are obliged to
respond to the governor who represents both the
President in the province, and the Ministry of
the Interior.11 Territorial administrators are
meant to represent the state at the local level
and supervise collectivities, but they are largely
unable to function independently. At a lower
level traditional powers are exercised by
chieftaincies, also called collectivities. 
Traditional authorities have managed their
entities since the colonial period. The collectivity
groups one culturally homogeneous community
whose powerholder is decided according to ethnic
traditions and recognised or formalised by the
state following the application of traditional
rules. The head of the collectivity carries the
traditional title of Mwami (king, pl. Bami). 
The collectivity is subdivided into Groupements,
which extend traditional power at the level of
regrouped villages, which are themselves
supervised by chiefs of villages. Territorial
Administrators and their assistants in rural
areas are often drawn from outside the
community and need to govern with the Bami,
the real powerholders, if they want to be obeyed
by the local population.12
Various new elites are a challenge to traditional
authorities. Elites in South Kivu include career
civil servants and politicians, church leaders,
renowned intellectuals, businessmen13 and civil
society members, army and various militia
personnel who helped defend their territory
during troubled periods, etc. They constitute a
heterogeneous group, with different backgrounds
and educational qualifications.
Other leadership present in the local governance
arena derive from a transitional or temporary
presence in the region. These include
humanitarian agents within the health system
and those providing various social services during
periods of duress. Elites that participate in the
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management of the province can be considered
outsiders, i.e. they may not be natives of Kivu, but
they control resources that are valuable to the
nation and the province, such as the armed forces,
the police, information services, and the public
administration. In this respect, UN Organization
Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and MONUSCO
commanders, directors of public enterprises,
financial private and public services, tax collecting
agencies, etc., each one within his/her own realm,
controls a parcel of power and resources that may
be used positively or negatively, according to rule
or in an informal manner, to secure and build
status for him/herself within the immediate
surrounding community. 
The provincial judiciary system also fits into the
hierarchy established by the state. The Supreme
Court is unique and accessible only in Kinshasa.
The highest court in the province is the Court of
Appeal, followed by the High Court and the
Peace Tribunal. The Court of Appeal operates in
Bukavu, along with the Prosecutor General
(Parquet Général). They are supported by only two
first-instance tribunals and prosecution offices in
Bukavu and Uvira. Secondary tribunals have
been de-concentrated in order to make the
distance somewhat more manageable.14
The Tribunals of Peace are a lower level of
justice administration. They are supposed to be
closer to the people and are to gradually replace
urban and city tribunals (in Bukavu, Kadutu and
Uvira) and traditional tribunals in the rural
areas.15 Administrative authorities like the
territorial administrator, the chief (Mwami) of a
collectivity and the chief of the grouping
(Groupement) combine at the same time the role
of administrator and judge. 
Security in the DRC is mostly perceived as:
(i) the defence of the integrity of the territory
and consequently the sovereignty of the state,
from invasion and external threats, and (ii) the
maintenance of domestic law and order. The
President is almost solely responsible for security
issues. More broadly, security services comprise
the army, the police, and the intelligence and
information-gathering services such as the
National Security Council (Conseil National de
Sécurité, CNS), the National Information-
gathering Agency (l’Agence Nationale de
Renseignements, ANR). The General Directorate
of Migration (Direction Générale des Migration,
DGM), military information services, and the
frontier police may also be considered as security
actors at the provincial level.
4 Background to the wars and their causes 
Explanations abound for the recurrent wars in
the eastern provinces of the DRC. Some outside
observers claim the region possesses a culture
that is oriented toward violence. This view
contradicts, however, the peaceful nature of most
communities living in the area, which claim self-
defence as the only factor which may explain
their participation in any kind of violence or
aggression against another group. 
The presence in the region of substantial
mineral deposits which could be used to finance
military adventures and enrich the countries and
individuals involved, is also a potentially
important factor (Collier and Hoeffler 1998,
2000). Indeed, South Kivu is endowed with
minerals like gold, cassiterite, coltan and
wolfram, exploited on an artisanal basis. Yet, the
presence of minerals by itself does not suffice to
explain the violence and its escalation into a
security issue among communities. Much or even
possibly most of their production is smuggled to
Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and even Kenya,16
and mostly the minerals are produced in those
areas of persistent insecurity due to the presence
of Interahamwe and other foreign militias. This
explanation therefore points toward
international intrusion.
4.1 Rwanda and Rwandaphones 
The fundamental causes of the wars may
therefore lie in the ways in which the
Government of Rwanda, under Paul Kagame,
has responded to matters in the DRC. At first,
the cause of war was the presence of large
numbers of Hutu refugees from Rwanda in
South Kivu. They had fled to Congo after the
Hutu genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus
and the victory of the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic
Front (RPF) in 1994. The refugees included
members of the previous Rwandan army and the
Hutu militia (the Interahamwe), who had not
been disarmed at the border. The refugees were
packed into camps near the Rwandan border,
from whence the militia continued to organise
minor intrusions into Rwanda in 1995–6 and
planned its return to topple the RPF regime. The
tracking down of armed Hutu refugees has given
legitimacy to the cross-border adventure of
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Rwanda in the DRC and its occupation of its
eastern provinces. But as the continued
involvement of Rwandaphone forces in eastern
Congo since the overthrow of the Mobutu
government demonstrate, the issues that
provoked Kagame’s attention went well beyond
the armed Interahamwe refugees.
German and Belgian colonialism interrupted a
period of state consolidation and territorial
expansion on the part of Rwanda and Burundi,
which are closely related linguistically and
socially. The dynamics of these states had led, by
the mid-nineteenth century, to the establishment
of Barundi and Rwandaphone Tutsis in what
became the South Kivu Province of the Belgian
Congo – the former in the Ruzizi plains near
Uvira and the latter in the highlands above Lake
Tanganyika, eventually in Shabunda. Although
the Barundi and Banyarwanda were often trying
to escape from the centralising power of their
states, their presence often was used as a
rationale for an expansion of borders by their
monarchs (Newbury 1988). This process was
interrupted by colonialism, however.
Additionally, in the 1930s Belgium encouraged
the settlement of Hutu labourers from densely
populated Rwanda in the Masisi area of North
Kivu Province. Although population movement
has been a constant in African history (and
indeed of the world) the presence of these
Rwandaphone enclaves in Congo had not become
socially or administratively stabilised at the time
of independence. Tutsi numbers in Congo
probably increased after the 1959 revolution in
Rwanda brought the Hutus to power there. The
presence of these Banyarwanda and Barundi in
Congo became a part of the concerns of Rwanda
and to a lesser extent Burundi from 1996.
Congolese Rwandaphones (in South Kivu
generally known as Banyamulenge) were among
Kagame’s RPF forces when they first invaded
Rwanda. They also responded positively to the
call of President Kagame to rebuild and resettle
Rwanda after the genocide, and subsequently
joined in the Alliance of Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Congo (l’Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques, AFDL) rebellion that toppled
Mobutu in 1996.17 What explains the
participation of Congolese Rwandaphones in
these military struggles with other Congolese
and the unusual antagonism felt toward them by
their neighbours?
Of course there are tensions between other
ethnic groups in South Kivu, driven by
competition for the appropriation of the state and
its favours, and over the issue of land. Political
representation is itself dependent on the
possession of a territorial space which a group
might claim as its own exclusive domain. So the
two issues are not unrelated – but it is only for
the Rwandaphones that they have led to war. 
Bosco Muchukiwa advances another source of
conflict that seems to be appropriate in the
plains of Ruzizi: the unequal stabilisation of
ethnic entities into established and durable
administrative spaces during the colonial period.
He postulates that the reconfiguration of ethnic
territories into administrative entities and their
transition or integration into state territory is
the fundamental issue of the political dynamics
of communities which explains the persistence of
local conflicts in the territory of Uvira. He
believes that the integration of communities in
the state space is problematic and is a source of
conflict between ethnic groups, particularly
between the Banyamulenge and the Babembe
(Muchukiwa 2006: 1–4). It is therefore important
to devote some words to the claims of
communities over land. 
4.2 Claims of communities over land
The population of South Kivu Province is
composed of various ethnic groups. Each group
claims a portion of land as its own over which it
should possess implicit rights of admittance and
exclusion.18 South Kivu is usually considered to be
comprised of four sets of ethnic groups: the
Shi-Havu group (Bashi-Bahavu), the Lega-Bembe
group (Barega- Babembe), the Fuliru-Vira (Bavira-
Bafulero) group and then other ethnic minorities.
Most political action since independence involves
stable coalitions or compromises between the
first three. Their leaders, although at times
antagonists, have developed permanent ways of
collaborating and negotiating when it comes to
politicking either at the national level or power-
sharing at provincial levels.
The fourth group, termed minorities, comprises
groups that are assimilated internally to
dominant groups, or externally to other nations.
These include the Barundi and Banyamulenge,
who originate from the former kingdoms of
Burundi and Rwanda. However, the perception of
them is different from other minority groups.
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The Barundi were well established in the Ruzizi
plain and gained formal status as a collectivity
and chiefdom in 1928. Although they live near
the Ruzizi River, claim families and relatives on
both sides of the river, in Burundi and in Congo,
they live harmoniously with other groups. 
The Banyamulenge, on the other hand, are not
similarly integrated. As already noted, they were
present in Congo in the pre-colonial period and
are basically composed of, or assimilated to, the
Tutsi. Banyamulenge identity19 has remained
fluid because of recent migrations of other
Rwandese populations to DRC during the
conflicts around independence and the recurrent
conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.
Their quest for a personalised identity, better
integration into South Kivu life and a clear
distinction from their Rwandan origins has been
diversely misperceived as a way of changing
history or seeking to claim lands which belong to
other ethnic groups.20
At present the Banyamulenge do not formally
posses their own administrative entity, collectivity,
or uncontested land. In 1998, however, when the
Rwanda government-supported Rassemblement
Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) occupied
the territory during the Second Congo War, an
administrative territory of Minembwe was erected
in favour of the Banyamulenge, but it did not
survive the reunification of Congo after the Sun
City accords of 2003. 
Minembwe was created by assembling portions
of lands drawn from three neighbouring
territories, Uvira, Fizi, and Mwenga, which
allegedly the Banyamulenge group could claim
because numerically they are the main
inhabitants in the areas involved. Although they
do indeed represent large portions of the
populations of most of the areas, as soon as the
reunification occurred, portions of this new
territory were reclaimed by the leadership of the
original territories, leaving all the
Banyamulenge community unhappy at having
reaped no tangible benefits from a war which
bore their name (the Banyamulenge War).21
As pastoralists, the Banyamulenge cannot be
located at one single space. This hinders them
from constituting a political force capable of
competing with other groups in the electoral
process. Although every ethnic group is
considered to be a minority in the larger DRC,
the Banyamulenge can be indeed considered as a
minority even locally because they lived isolated,
for a long time, from other groups.
Although now changing, a central concern for
the Banyamulenge has long been how to protect
their way of life and cultural values against the
invasion of others, particularly how to graze their
cattle during the dry season, and protect them
from diseases and theft. This concern
determined their involvement in politics and
wars during independence.22
Note that the issue for the Banyamulenge and
their neighbours is not access to land but
jurisdiction over it. Land in the contested areas
is not scarce, and in any case the Banyamulenge
are already using it without serious challenge.
The issue instead is who has suzerainty over the
land and whether the Banyamulenge have their
own formal administrative territory, for these
niceties determine recognition by the state and
the ability to participate effectively in elections
and decision-making processes.
5 War and governance
5.1 Coping with chaos
Communities coped with the multiple dimensions
of insecurity with great difficulty during the war,
but they remained intact and their pre-war
(traditional) leadership structures continued to
provide a degree of governance response after the
central state apparatus disappeared. 
Individual families used kinship mechanisms to
cater for their security. Some families, children
and wives were sent to secure places, hidden and
known only by the members of the group. The
Barega identified secure areas in the forests and
built what are called lubunga where they
retreated until a danger was gone. Babembe
from Baraka and Fizi migrated to Kigoma in
Tanzania, and to the peninsula of Ubwari. The
Bahavu of Kalehe found refuge on the island of
Idjwi and others went to scattered islands on
Lake Kivu. Even among the Banyamulenge,
those with family ties in Kigali or elsewhere in
Rwanda sent their families there. 
Displacement to major cities like Bukavu and
Uvira or areas which are secured by neutral
armies such as the MONUSCO also increased.
Small towns along the road in the plains of
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Ruzizi, in Nyangezi, Kabare and Walungu,
increased the number of their new migrants,23
leaving the interior depopulated and therefore
propitious for occupation. 
Others chose to join one of the belligerent groups
by creating a stable relationship with them, for
example by providing either a daughter to high-
ranking officers in exchange for security or a son
as a new recruit for a militia. The territory of
Shabunda, the region of Kaniola and the
chieftaincy of Burhinyi, which are currently under
the control of the (Hutu) Interahamwe, mostly
employed these strategies.24
5.2 Self-defence
Self-defence movements also sprung up in all
communities under various labels like the Maï
Maï, Ngumino Forces (FRF), the Mudundu 40,
etc. South Kivu’s populations were stung by the
defeat of the Congolese army in 1996 by Rwandan
troops. After the disintegration of the Congolese
State’s army and the fact that the Interahamwe,
its ally, was left alone to curb the advance of the
Rwandan army, the population decided to take
matters of defending the motherland in their own
hands as in ancient times. This movement was
supported by the diasporas and encouraged by
most traditional chiefs. 
When communities understood, from the
propaganda of Laurent Kabila’s AFDL entering
from Rwanda, that it was only interested in
passage not occupation, the allied forces
gradually received the support of local
communities and changed its image from
Rwandan intruders to a revolutionary force.
Most organised resistance groups disbanded and
some of them joined Kabila’s troops all the way
to Kinshasa. Resistance was most active among
the Babembe Maï Maï and continued after other
militias had agreed to incorporation into a
reorganised Congolese army.
Populations returned to the bush to reorganise
networks of popular self-defence mostly after the
second rebellion led by the RCD, the Rwandan
branch of AFDL, which was unhappy about the
way Kabila handled relations with them. 
Local resistance forces were efficient in
destabilising the Rwandan army. To counter the
action of the Maï Maï resistance groups
particularly, the Rwandan army tried to organise
its own militias. These groups seem to have been
better equipped in Luhwinja and Kaziba than
elsewhere, probably because some of their
leaders joined the RCD rebellion. The Bashi
group called the Mudundu 40 protected its
territory of Walungu with weapons supplied to it
by Rwanda in a deal that it would establish a
barrier against the Interahamwe. They
maintained peace with RCD until 2004 when the
latter’s troops invaded Bukavu.
Most of the self-defence groups evolved with no
provincial coordination until 1998 when the
Kinshasa government, which had completely lost
control in the province, tried to unify them,
supply military equipment, and help them to
continue to resist from the bush. This
governmental intrusion may have led to
leadership competition among the groups.
Although they were efficient in harassing and
embarrassing Rwandan troops, the locals
suffered many massacres during the process. If
Rwandan soldiers suffered a heavy loss nearby in
confrontation against the Maï Maï, they would
take revenge on those presumed to be the
latter’s supporters.25 Entire villages were burnt to
the ground and populations were massacred
without distinction. The more massacres were
perpetrated, the more the Maï Maï felt
compelled to resist and to liberate their lands.26
These forces were less active in the north of
South Kivu Province, where there was little
history of conflict with Rwandaphones
(Banyamulenge) and where traditional leaders
(such as the two Bami of the Bahavu) were more
likely to seek accommodation with Rwandan
(and Burundian) forces as they passed through
to attack refugee camps and to secure a hold on
the DRC and its mineral resources.
5.3 Militia matériel 
Those groups that were able to gain control over
mines in the interior of the Kivus were able to
use them to purchase munitions and other
supplies. Most of the mining areas were captured
by the armies of Rwanda and (in North Kivu)
Uganda and the continuing export of their
minerals (produced by the artisanal activities of
Congolese miners) supports their military
budgets. The Rwandaphone militias have been
provided with military support and matériel from
Rwanda (and Burundi in the early stages). 
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The opposing militias received some support from
Congolese patrons (typically fellow ethnics in the
capital) or, more usually, relied on raiding. The
proximity of Tanzania and the resistance of Maï
Maï on the peninsula of Ubwari facilitated the
group in getting supplies, including ammunition,
from Tanzania. The Bavira and Bafulero were
unable to secure enough ammunition and
concentrated on using elite shooters in order not
to waste ammunition. The national government in
Kinshasa may also have been able to parachute in
some weapons, ammunitions and communication
mostly in the territories of Shabunda and in other
areas in Walungu and Mwenga. 
6 Post-conflict local governance
6.1 Traditional authorities
The institutions of chieftaincy and kingship are
still quite popular and were easily and
universally re-established after the war. Although
the power of traditional chiefs is still respected, a
number of traditional leaders are developing new
venues of power within a larger polity. They are
represented in the local assembly, they run for
election to the national assembly, and they
provide patronage to their relatives or enter into
other deals with politicians. Most of the Bami no
longer live permanently in their villages. They
possess new homes in Bukavu or nearby cities. 
Further, it is hard for politicians to be elected
without the backing of their traditional village or
place of origin. That backing may depend on
traditional chiefs, who can use their traditional
capital and almost ‘sell’ their subjects’ votes.
This may be done in expectation of a positive
outcome for the chief, his immediate relatives or
the community.
Traditional authorities felt also the need to speak
out with one single voice, the COBASKI (Collège
des Bami et Autorités Traditionnelles du Sud
Kivu or the Assembly of Bami and other
traditional authorities of South Kivu). They
organised conferences from which they issued
statements and recommendations to de facto
authorities on how to improve relations with
communities, and also delivered messages to the
international community and even to the
government in Kinshasa. Such organisations
were useful in convincing the population on what
attitude to adopt in relation to the de facto power
of Rwanda during RCD invasion, and who to
blame in case of disorder.
6.2 Local justice
Despite the resurrection of the chieftaincy and
its popularity, many of the features of Native
Administration (NA) that once made it so strong
have been weakened. The NA courts now
compete with alternative dispute resolution
agencies created by donor-financed NGOs during
the war. When these new structures are paired
with the newly extended magistrates’ courts they
appear to be an increasingly preferred
alternative for most people.
The provision of justice was already biased and
corrupted during the reign of President Mobutu
and worsened during war. Warlords considered it
their right to rule and render justice in places
under their control. The leader of any militia
could order punishment leading even to death
for a person, village or a group of persons
accused of collaboration, spying, providing
mystical powers, or some other kind of support to
the enemy. The justice of the conqueror was
punitive, unilateral and with no appeal. 
For the population, a justice system in the hands
of the enemy could only be illegitimate and
partial. The denial of justice and its
de-legitimation led people to renounce it. It was
socially inimical to bring a case against a
member of one’s group before this kind of
justice. The community witnessed the
development of alternative forms of justice, some
of which were indeed expeditious, while others
insisted on soft ways of ruling through
reconciliation, mutual agreement and arbitrage. 
Mob justice was exercised mostly in cases of
armed robbery, killing with guns, accusation of
collaborating with the enemy or being a sorcerer.
Most persons interviewed see this practice as a
revolt against prevailing impunity, especially
against seeing persons accused of high crimes
being released and continuing to threaten the
community.27 When the state doesn’t correctly
perform its duties, people return to their own
ways of getting justice. This kind of justice did
not stop with the end of war.28
Alternative ways of curbing this kind of justice
evolved from churches and civil society.29 They all
preach arbitration, negotiated arrangements and
resolving matters within the community. They
consider that when issues are beyond their
ability, they can provide assistance and
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accompany the victims through the legal
procedures for getting justice.30 Catholic parishes
have organised permanent subunits of the
Commission on Justice and Peace.31 A group of
protestant churches also instituted a local NGO
to address justice and human rights.32
In rural areas, some traditional chiefs continue
to provide justice with limited results by running
traditional courts or the Baraza la Shirika; in
urban communities elected patriarchs establish a
‘committee of wise persons’, who provide advice
and judgement and negotiate intra-communal
settlements when a member of their community
has a grudge against a member of another. 
The case of Banyamulenge in Uvira is an
illustration of this. No Munyamulenge, whether
living in Uvira or coming directly from their area
in the mountains may go to court in Uvira,
without seeking first the advice and the
judgement of the elders or other appointed
persons. Apparently mutualités control, orient and
help their members during legal battles. They
provide for justice better than the magistrate
and the magistrate often seeks their opinion
before rendering justice. 
6.3 Militias 
It is common for those who play prominent roles
in a war to then claim civilian leadership
positions when it is over. Despite the valuable
role played by the local militias during the war
proper, abuses by some of their members have,
however, kept all but a few of their leaders from
assuming civilian leadership roles in post-conflict
Congo – even those who cooperated during
demobilisation. Most Maï Maï from Kivu did not
join civilian politics.33 Those true Maï Maï who
gained anything from the war joined the
Congolese army, where some of them became
officers.34 Most of the youth who joined the Maï
Maï movement did not have any ambition other
than defending their motherland against the
invaders or occupiers.
6.4 The Congolese army (Forces Armées de la RDC
[Armed Forces of the DRC], FARDC)
The Congolese army has been restructured to
include the various militias that fought during
the civil war. Communities have been exploited
in the integration process by some individuals
whose personal ambitions were not satisfied in
the new power-sharing system and decided to
manipulate or recruit followers in order to
increase their bargaining powers. The game of
advancing a personal career through rebellion
may also explain the current survival of some
Maï Maï groups in the plains, with the tacit
approval of politicians who may be located in
Bukavu or in Kinshasa.35
6.5 Policing
The Congolese Police has not been subject to
serious reform since the war36 and its mandate
continues to prioritise the protection of the state
rather than the population.37 In any case police
presence has always been thin on the ground in
the rural areas, where Native Administration
police under the direction of the Bami and chiefs
provided local security. However, these forces are
underfinanced, underpaid and ineffective. 
6.6 Mutualités
The role of mutualités is important in policing and
judging, and in bargaining with other groups and
outsiders, in matters pertaining to security and
political participation. When there are conflicts
between the citizens of different communities
the leaders of the respective mutualités negotiate
a settlement. Tribal and ethnic mutualités in
Bukavu are based on ethnic cultural
acquaintances in order to defend a certain
number of interests, among which
representation and participation in the political
arena rank high.38
These mutualités in Bukavu comprise three kinds:
mutualités representing communities from other
provinces, i.e. Congolese who do not consider
themselves as people of South Kivu; mutualités
based on ethnic lines, associating wider groups
for better political action; and mutualités
representing villages or communities on a spatial
dimension. 
Some citizens like the Banyamulenge find
protection by living in ethnically homogeneous
areas. In South Kivu, the organising of mutualités
and their activities reached a peak during the
period of war (Mulotwa 2006).39
Although most communities maintain a grudge
against the Banyamulenge, the real enemy is still
or was Rwanda, as it exploited the Banyamulenge,
who also suffered in the confrontations. The
purely local conflicts (most importantly between
the Babembe and the Banyamulenge) that
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underpinned the larger international and national
conflicts and gave them energy and persistence
have not been adequately addressed and help to
fuel the larger conflict today (Autesserre 2010).
Although the populations disagree with atrocities
which may be committed by their resistance
forces, they do not share the official idea of now
labelling all resistance movements as negative.
This is perceived as ingratitude by the state, which
was absent for a long time and could not protect or
defend the population against the enemy. 
7 The recreation of human security: lessons learned
7.1 Networked governance and the churches
Governance does not disappear when the state
collapses. Its structures remain hidden and in
retreat, but ready to sprout into existence again.
While true for all parts of government, it is
especially true for local and rural governance
structures. Consequently, post-conflict states
have much more need for decentralisation – and
possibilities for achieving it. Multilayered,
networked governance is a reality but it is much
less of a threat to vital states than might be
imagined. 
The Catholic Church’s leadership during and
after the war makes people see it as one of the
most important institutions sustaining society,
maintaining hope and helping to avoid the
oppressive official state and working for the
gradual renewal of the legitimate state. The
organisation of the Catholic Church transcends
national boundaries. From a parish in Uvira, to
Rwanda and Burundi, and from Bukavu to
Kinshasa, Rome and the whole world, messages
of various kinds were sent to sensitise the world
about the hell the Christians and populations of
South Kivu were suffering. Although the war
took a heavy toll on priests, nuns and bishops,
most priests remained in their parishes or left
them only for a short time and helped continue
to provide services.40
Inside South Kivu, civil society messages were
read through all parishes, recommending the
correct attitude people should follow and the way
they must behave in relation to the new power
holders. Church networks proved most beneficial
to communities in South Kivu. 
Churches also served as important advocates for
human rights, justice and democracy. The
(Catholic) Commission for Justice and Peace was
the most vocal advocate of alternative means of
restoring the state and the necessity of taming
the behaviour of the militias and armed groups.
Under its leadership, other NGOs and church
organisations such as the (Protestant) Héritiers
de la Justice (Heirs of Justice) joined together to
get neglected voices heard.41
Churches have emerged as one of the most
accessible and durable channels of outside
assistance to local communities. During the war,
the church played an important role in providing
basic and other services necessary to its own
deployment such as small airport runways in
remote areas, roads leading to churches and
within the community, building dams and
generating electricity via solar energy.42
7.2 Local conflicts
The purely local conflicts that helped to fuel the
larger conflict in the Great Lakes region have
been barely addressed. MONUSCO has focused
on denying rebel militia’s control of territory,
and has not been actively engaged in building
the citizen foundations for peace. MONUSCO is
an anglophone operation in a francophone
country. When this is combined with the six
month tours of duty of MONUSCO soldiers and
many of the senior civilian staff, tools for
understanding local complexities and conducting
local peace negotiations are lacking.
A key failing in the state reconstruction process
in Kivu is that the purely local conflicts (most
importantly between the Babembe and the
Banyamulenge) that underpinned the larger
international and national conflicts and gave
them energy and persistence, have not been
adequately addressed. 
The social contract between the state and society
has largely been re-established in Congo. Partly,
this is due to the powerful negative lesson of what
the alternative represents. The war was truly
devastating. However, there are tensions that will
need to be addressed. Security Sector Reforms of
the Congolese army and police have not begun in
the province, adding to insecurity. In fact, in Kivu,
the informal ceding of the army to Rwandaphones
is a source of conflict and insecurity.
Rwanda and/or Rwandaphones cannot be
allowed by the international community to
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become an army of occupation over the other
groups. This will require (i) a negotiated
settlement between the Banyamulenge and
Babembe that gives security to both groups
(together with a similar set of agreements in
North Kivu), and (ii) the return to an ethnically
balanced army. The latter will require (a) the
departure of non-Congolese Rwandan soldiers
and a break in the link between those who
remain and Rwanda, and (b) a more genuinely
national posting process for soldiers in the army.
Point (i) (security for the Rwandaphones) is a
prerequisite to the others and that is why locally
negotiated settlements are so important.
Granting Minembwe territory status on a
permanent basis also should be put on the agenda
of settlement as well as the intensification of
exchanges between the Banyamulenge and other
ethnic groups. It is important to open up roads
toward the mountains of Itombwe so that
communication can flow easier. Changing
methods of farming may take longer but it may
prove in the end a way of changing the habits of
isolation of Banyamulenge groups.
7.3 Rebuilding the formal state
A focus on rebuilding and financing the purely
local aspects of governance should consider the
following actions: 
i enabling Bami, chiefs and Native
Administration police to be functional and to
do without the revenues of the now
discredited traditional courts (it is unwise to
rely upon an expanded national police force as
it is clear that it is resistant to reform); and 
ii providing adequate funds for the travel and
functioning of the territorial administration
and magistrates.
Paying the wages of soldiers, policemen,
magistrates and administrative officers on a
regular basis and improving them would diminish
their predation on the population and improve
their professionalism. It is a priority demand
which was expressed in almost all our interviews
conducted in the original report (Mushi 2011).
Elections are increasingly seen as a tool the
population might use to voice its demands to the
polity. In the last 2011 legislative elections Maï
Maï contested under the label of Parti Republicain
Maï Maï (Maï Maï Republican Party), rather than
trusting politicians in Kinshasa. They contested in
the territories of Fizi (3), Shabunda (2), Uvira (5),
Mwenga (4), and in the city of Bukavu (5). They
joined the coalition of the presidential majority.
Yet, none of the candidates was elected to a seat as
representative in the national assembly. Municipal
and local elections were postponed, which does not
allow us to assess what the outcome would have
been at the local level. 
The Congolese army has been restructured to
include the various militias which fought during
the civil war. This has become a major problem
in the Kivu provinces, as the Rwandaphones who
were incorporated refused to be posted outside
their home provinces, while the soldiers from the
other groups were sent elsewhere. This has left
an overwhelmingly Rwandaphone Congolese
army in Kivu. The other ethnic groups see this
force as a foreign army of occupation. The
resulting hostility between the army and those
whom it ostensibly protects has resulted in
atrocities against the locals and has led to
petitions in some areas for the army to leave. In
short the army is seen as a source of insecurity.
Clashes between the Maï Maï Yakutumba and
the governmental army, and clashes between the
Ngumino Banyamulenge and the Congolese
army are more likely to occur nowadays than
clashes between both cited groups.43
8 Conclusion
Life during the absence of a real state in South
Kivu was precarious; economic activities were
disturbed and poverty became severe. People
living in a state of precariousness are more
concerned with themselves, less cooperative,
prone to conflicts and easily exploited by
external forces. 
Despite the end of violent confrontations, and
the return of a more peaceful state in many
areas, the situation in South Kivu remains
volatile. The behaviour of many groups is
determined by the fear that another cycle of war
by Rwanda is in the making, with the aim of
separating North and South Kivu from Congo,
and that steps to this end are already being
taken through subtle political and administrative
manoeuvring as well as economic and military
infiltration. 
This threat makes all groups feel uneasy, fearful
and suspicious against one another. Local
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communities believe strongly that South and
North Kivu are evolving under Rwandan
imperialism, and that the Banyamulenge in
South Kivu and other Tutsi in North Kivu may
again constitute a Trojan horse.
This affects also the vision that communities
have regarding current international and
national institutions. The army and other
security organisations are distrusted and
considered to be controlled by Rwandans through
the Banyamulenge. The police are not deployed
in rural areas, and therefore the security of the
population is threatened constantly. 
Although MONUSCO’s presence is helpful, its
deployment is also sometimes associated with
complicity. Yet no one wants MONUSCO to
leave South Kivu. Instead, people want it to be
more committed and to improve its methods of
protecting the local population and fighting
against infiltration.
Security will remain precarious and justice
partial in South Kivu, as long as unemployment
remains severe, the army continues to be
unevenly controlled and undisciplined, civil
servants are left in miserable conditions, and
uncontrolled militias from within and
neighbouring countries control large portions of
Congolese land.
When the state is totally incapable of assuring the
security of its own population against external
threats, when its own protective services engage
in arbitrary activities and live off the people, and
when impunity goes unchecked, it is difficult for
social mechanisms and local institutions alone to
substitute for the lack of a decisive body capable
of assuming the role of the leviathan.
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Notes
1 An extended report on the research discussed
in this article can be found in Mushi (2011).
2 Indeed such a course has been recommended
for the Congo by Autesserre (2010).
3 The Shabunda Territory could not be reached
because of distance and accessibility. However,
interviews were carried out with prominent
Shabunda leaders and various local NGO
coordinators who live in Bukavu for security
reasons. 
4 Prof. David K. Leonard from the Institute of
Development Studies joined me and
participated in the second round of interviews
in October 2010.
5 These include the 1960 army mutiny,
secession wars in various provinces, the
Marxist-backed rebellion in the Bandundu
(1963–7), the Schramme war in Kisangani
(1976), the Shaba wars (1977 and 1978),
plunder by the army in 1991 and 1993, the
so-called liberation war (1996–7) that toppled
the dictatorial regime of President Mobutu,
and the 1998–2002 conflict.
6 The state is subdivided into provinces, and
provinces into territories; territories comprise
either collectivities ruled by traditional chiefs
(called chieftaincies) or collectivities managed
by designated administrative authorities
because they combine numerous non-
homogeneous groups (called collectivités secteurs). 
7 Except for chieftaincies, the assembly votes in
the executive committee and holds the power
of its dismissal. The provincial assembly also
holds the power to designate senators who
represent the province in the national senate.
8 Representatives in legislative bodies are
elected thus: candidates may run as
independents or designated persons on a party
list. In any electoral constituency, parties are
represented according the proportion of all
votes won by the sum of their candidates. A
candidate who has a high score gains enough
points to win not only his seat, but also helps
to pull up lower scoring candidates of the
same party. The current system therefore
decreases feelings of representation.
9 The population considers that the nomination
of various governors stems from Kinshasa’s
various electoral strategies as well as its
international relations, particularly those with
Rwanda, since the 1996 and the 1998 wars. 
10 Local and municipal elections planned in 2006
were postponed indefinitely. According to the
new electoral calendar, they are now
scheduled to be held in 2013.
11 The governor is elected and dismissed by the
provincial assembly. In reality, however, the
party determines the outcome from Kinshasa,
presenting the candidate for election at the
provincial level and decides when he gets
removed. 
12 Some collectivities, however, are not ruled by a
Mwami. Their head is designated by the
administrator of the territory, in line with
elections held by the council of the collectivity.
Such an entity is referred to as a ‘collectivity
sector’.
13 The ‘new rich’ draw their standing from:
plantations left by Belgians of quinquina, tea,
coffee and timber; minerals trading,
particularly gold and coltan; and urban real
estate ownership. Like traditional chiefs,
newly rich people also capitalise on their
wealth in order to gain access to political
power. 
14 They serve the province according to
proximity. Given the distances, poor means of
communication, the harshness of the terrain,
and the long-lasting insecurity, this judicial
architecture cannot efficiently cover all of
Kivu and guarantee access to due process.
15 In rural areas in South Kivu this comprises
territorial tribunals and principal collectivity’s
tribunals. In 2004 this comprised seven
tribunals organised by the territory and 22
tribunals organised by collectivities.
16 A World Bank (La Banque Mondiale 2008: 65)
report confirms the intensity of mineral
smuggling from Congo to neighbouring
countries, but provides no clear data on the
volume and value of this process. A company
called TransAfrika discovered gold in Rwanda
for the first time in 2008 but even before then,
mineral exports by private companies in
Rwanda contributed to the Rwandan balance
of payment.
17 During the 1996 war, the Banyamulenge sided
early with the rebellious army of Laurent
Désiré Kabila, probably under the instigation
of the larger Rwandan community in Rwanda
and in Kivu. Other groups joined later after
being opposed to what they termed the war of
the Banyamulenge requesting a territory of
their own. The experience of the first war led
the Banyamulenge to split up during the 1998
war led by the Rassemblement Congolais pour
la Démocratie (RCD). Some of them remained
loyal to the Congolese state, others joined in
the new rebellion. Therefore, the main source
of conflict over the last decade in South Kivu
is the intrusion of Rwanda into Congolese
politics and its manipulation of some local
groups against others.
18 During the colonial era, lands inhabited by
indigenous communities were protected by
law. Any other lands belonged to King
Leopold and after him to the colony. However,
in 1969, Mobutu decreed by law that all land
belonged to the state. Despite this, traditional
chiefs continue to exercise rule over the land
that they claim as belonging to their tribe by
custom. 
19 Banyamulenge are increasingly identified as a
separate group with their own identity, drawn
from their long autarkical life on the high
plateaus of the chain of Mitumba.
20 Until the 1920s the Banyamulenge paid
tribute to the Mwami of the Babembe, and
although Babembe land is not scarce the
group resents the loss of recognition of its
suzerainty.
21 The popular discourse among the other groups
alleges that the objective of the formation of
Minembwe was to annex the territory to
Rwanda but the creation of a Banyamulenge
territory could actually be an alternative to
annexation. Other populations perceive,
however, that the territory would be used in
the long run by Rwanda to claim rights over
the provinces of North and South Kivu.
22 The patriarchs of the Banyamulenge recall
that one settler called Reagan had a farm over
the hills in the area in which the
Banyamulenge live. During the 1963 Mulele
rebellion the Simba in this area fed this
settler’s cattle until his entire farm was
looted. At first, the Banyamulenge attempted
to associate with the rebellion against the
state together with the other communities,
the Bembe, the Fuliru and the Vira. But when
the other groups started to feed themselves on
the Banyamulenge’s own herds, they shifted
alliance and became the best servants of the
Congolese national army. Their knowledge of
the corridors of the mountains helped the
Congolese army to regain control over these
spaces and crush the rebellion. This left a
feeling of betrayal among the other groups
who have since considered all Banyamulenge
as traitors. 
23 The word ‘migrant’ is not fully appropriate.
The correct phrase would be internally
displaced families in the same ethnic group.
Most chiefs interviewed reported that their
communities were heterogeneous and that
everybody lived peacefully. Integration in
South Kivu does not generally pose a problem
to communities provided the new migrant
obeys the rules of first recognising the local
traditional ruler and seeking his protection. 
24 These strategies had unfortunate future
consequences for these communities and on
the status of women. 
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25 Registered massacres on the road to Mwenga
and on the roads to Fizi are a testimony of
how the idea of vengeance and the assurance
of impunity during disputed sovereignty left
the soldier to become the ruler on parcels of
land. Innocent civilians suffered during the
RCD period because of the Maï Maï
resistance, where women were buried alive
because they were considered to have been
sorcerers who prepared medicine to make the
Maï Maï invincible and fearless.
26 Unfortunately, massacres committed by
Rwandan soldiers, or by other persons who
joined in this adventure, were indiscriminately
associated with the Banyamulenge, reinforcing
the antagonism of other communities and
their image as a heartless people. 
27 As one respondent put it, mob justice
constitutes a response of the population to the
state’s abdication of its duties. Thus, the
population takes matters in its own hands.
28 Mob justice during Mobutu’s era was checked
and controlled. In some areas, for example
among the Barega, death by mob justice is
still rare. It remains a phenomenon contained
in the cities for robbers. In villages, persons
suspected of witchcraft could also be victims
of such justice but it was uncommon during
the colonial and Mobutu eras. Impunity today
seems to depend on who is involved. However,
it is recidivism that makes the youth in urban
areas decide to settle such problems
themselves. 
29 Many other NGOs have fostered alternative
ways of getting justice in a similar manner in
South Kivu. 
30 The Commission for Justice and Peace is
operated by the Catholic Church throughout
its entire organisation. It and the Protestant
Héritiers de la Justice (Heirs of Justice) are
examples of mechanisms which evolved from
churches and civil society, backed by
numerous international charities in order to
improve advocacy for neutral justice and the
access of neglected people to decent justice. 
31 A Commission for Justice and Peace is
instituted in all parishes. The most common
conflicts registered through these
commissions deal with landownership, debt
default and suspicion of witchcraft.
32 Héritiers de la Justice also specialises in advocacy
for human rights and justice, developing
alternative ways of doing justice, training the
paramilitary and assisting poor victims and
raped women to seek justice by providing
them lawyers and defenders at no cost. They
also organise training sessions, radio and
television broadcasts, and teach courses on
human rights in primary schools. 
33 Congolese politicians or bureaucrats gained
by using the Maï Maï to foster their political
existence.
34 Those who were unhappy with the deal like
Zabuloni and Yakutumba returned to continue
resistance in their native areas. 
35 There are tales, for example, of some former
Maï Maï and the soldiers of the DRC from
different ethnic groups joining the CNDP
(People’s Defence National Congress) with
the hope that future negotiations with the
state would help them advance. 
36 Nlandu (2012) provides a comprehensive
overview of policing in post-conflict DRC.
37 The police in the rural territories are almost
non-existent. In Shabunda for example, there
were only four policemen stationed at the
territory. Territorial administrators and
assistant administrators therefore rely mostly
on individuals recruited out of necessity and
not recorded with the national administration
of the police body. 
38 Flourishing at the end of the colonial era,
mutualités of this kind were not tolerated
during the Mobutu era. It was only at the
beginning of the democratisation process in
1989 that the power of mutualités was
unleashed.
39 In terms of local politics, these mutualités end
up regrouping in the most important axes:
SBB (or Solidarity of Bashi and Bahavu) and
the LUSU-LEGA (Mutuality for the Barega),
particularly when it comes to designating the
Governor and the Vice Governor and the
provincial ministers of his administration.
40 Archbishop Munzihirwa’s order to all members
of the Catholic clergy whether European or
local, that no matter what happened they had
to stay on duty and continue to help their
parishes, was totally obeyed. Abbeys,
missionaries and nuns continued to serve the
community, and the Church’s external links
were not broken. Maria Mason, a consecrated
woman, did magnificent work maintaining
medical activities throughout the province and
indirectly mobilised the aid of charity
organisations linked with the universal church,
such as Misereor, Caritas, Christian Relief Aid,
and so on.
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41 The Commission for Justice and Peace in
Bukavu also helped develop alternative ways
of providing justice by preaching negotiation
and reconciliation between groups. It helped
commissions at the parish level take over the
process of settlement of issues through mutual
agreement and understanding instead of
using an unfair and oppressive justice system.
42 The Church took an important lead on two
services: the Bureau Diocésain des Oeuvres
Médicales (Diocesan Office for Medical Action,
BDOM) maintained the health system in the
name of the state and provided, without
discrimination, assistance to all; and the Bureau
Diocésain de Development (Diocesan Office for
Development, BDD), sometimes in cooperation
with other NGOs, implemented small
development activities such as the provision of
water, the building of schools, roads, etc.
Caritas also mobilised charitable assistance
from within and without to the country. 
43 Since May 2012, the DRC is facing a new
rebellion, the M23 rebellion, which was
initiated in North Kivu, led by General Bosco
Ntaganda, a former lieutenant of Laurent
Nkundabatware, following attempts by the
Congolese Government to arrest him.
General Ntaganda had helped to end the
CNDP rebellion by signing a peace
agreement, and fostered the integration of
Rwandaphone soldiers in the Congolese army
in 2009. The M23 rebellion was launched by
former CNDP and Parti des Résistants
Congolais (PARECO) soldiers based in North
Kivu, in spaces formerly controlled militarily
by Laurent Nkunda.
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